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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tended to include both the public officer and attorney-at-law, requir-
ing them to sign a waiver of immunity, or forfeit their official position.
BERNARD ROTHMAN.
THE WRONGFUL DEATH ACT AS AFFECTED BY THE SURVIVAL
STATUTE
Unlike the situation at the common law,1 one does not take to the
grave with him an action against the wrongdoer when dying as a result
of personal injuries. The personal representative may, in his own
name, commence an action for damages suffered by the deceased. 2
Closely akin to such right of action is that possessed by the same rep-
resentative to sue for damages, suffered by certain designated beneficia-
ries by reason of the death, in a-case where an action could have been
maintained by the deceased had he survived.3 In such case the damages
recovered are distributable to the beneficiaries, separate and apart
from the decedent's estate.4 These substantive rights, not recognized
by common law, exist today only by virtue of legislative fiat.5 The
two causes.of action may be consolidated and prosecuted in one; but,
so related are the rights that it is often difficult to decide where one
ends and the other begins, or to distinguish the incidents of one from
those of the other.
"And in action merely personal, arising ex delicto, for wrongs
actually done or committed by the defendant, as trespass, battery, and
slander, the rule is that actio personahs moritur cune persona, and it
never shall be revived either by or against the executors or other rep-
resentatives. For neither the executors of the plaintiff have received,
nor those of the defendant have committed, in their own personal
capacity any manner of wrong or injury?' " This rule, that no civil
action would lie for death resulting from injury, was first based on
the doctrine that the civil injury was merged in the felony, which was
more grave as an offense to the crown.7 Such reasoning failed where
there was no felony. In later decisions the conclusion was reached
that the law could not permit the evaluation of damages resulting'from
the loss of human life.8 Probably the reason for the existence of
1 Stuber v. McEntee, 142 N. Y. 200, 36 N. E. 878 (1894); Roche v. St.
John's Riverside Hospital, 96 Misc. 289, 160 N. Y. Supp. 401 (1916) (at com-
mon law no right of action for causing death existed).
2 N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW §§ 119, 120.
3 Id. §130.
4 See note 20, infra.
5 De Bevoise v. N. Y., Lake Erie & W. R. R., 98 N. Y. 377 (1885); Stuber
v. McEntee, 142 N. Y. 200, 36 N. E. 878 (1894).
6 3 BL. CoMM. *302.
7 Conners v. Burlington, etc. Ry., 171 Iowa 490, 32 N. W. 465 (1887).
s Philby v. Northern Pac. R. R., 46 Wash. 173, 89 Pac. 468 (1907).
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the rule is the unquestioning adherence to the ipse dixit of Lord
Ellenborough in the case of Baker v. Bolton.9 Although the principle
above stated was later modified, in some respects, by judicial and legis-
lative action,10 the New York legislature, assuming that at the com-
mon law a personal representative could not maintain an action for a
tort, passed a statute permitting such an action for torts to property
of decedent committed during his lifetime."' So strongly imbedded in
the common law was the principle that an action for personal injuries
dies with the person that further legislation was necessary to compel
the courts to disregard such a rule of barbarity.12
In 1847 the legislature passed a bill ' 3 which gave to the personal
representative of one whose death had been caused by the wrongdoing
of another, a right of action for damages for the benefit of next of kin.
It was a substantial model of Lord Campbell's Act,' 4 which has
inspired much of such legislation in the United States. "The dis-
tinguishing features of that act are * * * : First, it is grounded upon
the original wrongful injury of the person; second, it is for the eiclu-
sive benefit of certain specified relatives; third, the damages are such
as flow from the deprivation of the pecuniary benefits which the benefi-
ciaries might have reasonably received if the decedent had not died
from his injuries." 1 The right of action was given constitutional
protection in 1894,16 so that it can never be abrogated, and the amount
recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation.' 7
To recover damages for death by wrongful act, the following facts
must be proved: (a) the death of a human being, (b) caused by the
wrongdoing of another, (c) who would have been liable to an action
brought by decedent had he lived, (d) a husband, wife, or next of kin
of the decedent surviving him ,and (e) the appointment of a personal
representative of the decedent.' It would seem that, because the
right of action is dependent upon the decedent's right to sue if he were
alive, that the enactment, while technically giving a new cause of
action, really amounted to a continuation of the original cause of action
(which vested in decedent at the moment of injury) for the benefit of
9 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808) ; Gulf, etc. Ry. v. Beall, 91 Tex.
310, 42 S. W. 1054 (1897).
10 Zabriskie v. Smith, 13 N. Y. 322 (1855).
112 REv. STAT. 114, § 4.
12 POLLOCK, LAW oF TORTS (13th ed. 1929) 68.
'3 N. Y. Laws 1847, c. 450, §§ 1, 2.
14 9 & 10 Vicr. c. 93, §§ 1 & 2 (1846) ; In re Meng, 96 Misc. 126, 159 N. Y.
Supp. 535 (1916), aff'd, 188 App. Div. 69, 176 N. Y. Supp. 290 (1st Dept.
1919), order reV'd, 227 N. Y. 264, 125 N. E. 508 (1919), reargutnent denied,
227 N. Y. 669, 126 N. E. 914 (1920).
15 Michigan C. R. R. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 70, 33 Sup. Ct. 192 (1912).
26 N. Y. CoxsT. art. I, § 16.
'17 In re Taylor, 204 N. Y. 135, 97 N. E. 502 (1912).
IsIn re Meng, 96 Misc. 126, 159 N. Y. Supp. 535 (1916), aff'd, 188 App.
Div. 69, 176 N. Y. Supp. 290 (1st Dept. 1919), order revd, 227 N. Y. 264, 125
N. E. 508 (1919), reargument denied, 227 N. Y. 669, 126 N. E. 914 (1920).
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those next of kin designated.19 However, the better view is that such
"death statute" is not a "survival act", 20 but creates a new cause of
action, distinct from any the injured person might have had.2 ' Ac-
cordingly, judgments recovered do not constitute assets of the estate
of the deceased, but are a specific fund, the distribution of which is
limited to the persons indicated by the statute.2 2 If the death statute
was a continuation of the cause 'of action vesting in the decedent, it
would be logical to assume that the measure of damages should be the
injuries sustained by the deceased for which he may have recovered
had he lived. Then, too, it would seem that an action for wrongful
death is for an injury to the person rather than to property. The
New York view is that the right given under the statute is a property
right, and that the action is one to recover damages not for injuries to
the person of the decedent, but for wrongs done to the property rights
of the beneficiary.23 Accordingly, an action for wrongful death sur-
vives the death of a beneficiary, and it may be continued in behalf of
his estate. However, the damages are limited to the pecuniary loss
sustained by him up to the time of his death2 4 Although the general
purpose of the statute is to compensate the family of the deceased for
their pecuniary loss caused by the destruction of the life, the right is
extended only where there has been no recovery by the deceased in
his lifetime. A prerequisite to a death action is that the deceased
have, until the moment of his death, a cause of action for his injuries.25
Where the injured person recovered fo'r his pain and suffering before
his death, it was held that an action for the benefit of the next of kin
was barred. The legislature did not intend to create a double liability,
though it probably had the power to do so. 2 6
In 1935 the legislature finally took cognizance of the injustices
resulting from the previous state of the law. It was enacted that "No
cause of action for injury to person or property shall be lost because
of the death of the person in whose favor the cause of action existed" 27
(italics mine). It was further provided that, "Where an injury
19 Titman v. City of New York, 57 Hun 469, 10 N. Y. Supp. 689 (1890).2 0 Anderson v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 124 Misc. 829, 209 N. Y. Supp.
493 (1925).
21 Michigan Cent. R. R. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 33 Sup. Ct. 192 (1913);
Gulf, etc. R. R. v. McGinnis, 228 U. S. 173, 33 Sup. Ct. 426 (1913); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. McGill, 57 Fed. 699 (C. C. A. 8th, 1893) ; Littlewood v. Mayor,
etc., 89 N. Y. 24 (1882) ; Hegerich v. Keddie, 99 N. Y. 258, 1 N. E. 787 (1885).
22 Drake v. Gilmore, 52 N. Y. 389 (1873) ; Re Taylor, 204 N. Y. 135, 97
N. E. 502 (1912); Re Connor, 198 Misc. 538, 164 N. Y. Supp. 748 (1917),
mod'd, 178 App. Div. 955, 165 N. Y. Supp. 1081 (4th Dept. 1917), aff'd, 222
N. Y. 653, 119 N. E. 1036 (1918).23 Re Meekin, 164 N. Y. 145, 58 N. E. 50 (1900).
24 Aider v. General Electric Co., 238 N. Y. 64, 143 N. E. 792 (1924);
Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co., 161 Misc. 781, 293 N. Y .Supp. 53 (1937), aft'd, 251
App. Div. 667, 297 N. Y. Supp. 258 (2d Dept. 1937).25 Keliher v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R., 212 N. Y. 207, 105 N. E. 824 (1914).
26 Littlewood v. The Mayor, 89 N. Y. 24 (1882).
27 N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW (L. 1935, c. 795, § 2) § 119; PRASKER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON NEW YdRK PLEADING AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1937) 867.
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caused the death of a person the damages recoverable for such injury
shall be limited to those accruing before death, and shall not include
damages for or by reason of death. The damages recovered shall
form part of the estate of the deceased. Nothing herein contained
shall affect the cause of action existing in favor of the next of kin
under section one hundred and thirty of this chapter. Such cause of
action and the cause of action in favor of the estate to recover damages
accruing before death may be prosecuted to judgment in a single
action; a separate verdict, report or decision shall be rendered as to
each cause of action." 28 These additions to the law were intended to
remedy existing defects in the law in respect to abatement and sur-
vival; 29 and no doubt they would, but for strange quirks of the
judicial mind.
In .the case of Helman v. Markoff,30 the complaint stated two
causes of action: the first, to recover on behalf of the estate of plain-
tiff's intestate for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by
intestate up to the time of his death, and the second, to recover on
behalf of his widow and daughter for his wrongful death. The trial
court instructed the jury that they could bring in separate verdicts on
each cause of action, or combine the sums and bring in a single verdict
on both. The jury brought in a lump sum verdict. Interest, which
is allowable in a death action from date of death,3 1 was added on the
basis of the single verdict. To further complicate matters, neither
counsel objected to the charge; but that was not irreparable because
the Appellate Division, on appeal, may ignore the lack of exception.32
This time, however, the Appellate Division did not ignore the lack of
exception, and held that although the charge was erroneous, the error
was waived by appellant-defendant's failure to except to the charge.
The judgment in favor of plaintiff was modified by striking therefrom
the allowance of interest on the verdict, and, as so modified, affirmed.
Although the statute is in form mandatory, its provisions could be
waived by acquiescence. Since it was impossible to separate the
damages recovered for one cause of action from those recovered for
the other, there was no basis for the computation of interest. The
decision of the court is not entirely satisfactory unless one finds that
the error committed was not serious or prejudicial and resulted in no
injustice.
Appellant-defendant contended 33 that the verdict must be set
aside for a very good reason. Damages for personal injuries are
28 N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW (L. 1935, c. 795, § 3) § 120.2 9 N. Y. LAW RvisioNq ComltjrssIoN, Leg. Doc. (1935) No. 60 (E).
30 255 App. Div. 991, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 448 (2d Dept. 1938), aff'd, 280 N. Y.
641, 20 N. E. (2d) 1012 (1939).
31 N. Y. Laws 1870, c. 78; N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAw § 132.32 Muldoon v. Dock Contractor Co., 199 App. Div. 733, 192 N. Y. Supp. 19
(2d Dept. 1922), aff'd, 235 N. Y. 553, 139 N. E. 731 (1923); Pavinoznik v.
Fiske, 188 App. Div. 348, 177 N. Y. Supp. 61 (3d Dept 1919).
33 Brief for Appellant, p. 8, Helman v. Markoff, 280 N. Y. 641, 20 N. E.
(2d) 1012 (1939).
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assets of the estate of the deceased person and subject to the claims of
creditors, whereas damages for wrongful death are not a part of the
estate and are not subject to the claims of creditors. How much of
the lump sum verdict will go to the estate and how much is subject to
execution by creditors? The respondent admits 8 4 that the lack of
separate verdicts would be a problem only on the question of liquida-
tion of the debts of decedent. However, there is not the slightest
evidence that the deceased left any creditors, or if there are creditors,
that their claims cannot be satisfied otherwise. Here, whether the
verdict was joint or several, the beneficiaries were identical. The
undertaker and medical creditors would take from the proceeds of
either of the verdicts if they were separately rendered, and certainly
they are entitled to payment from the lump sum verdict. The ques-
tion raised was purely procedural. Apparently, where the rights of
creditors did not intervene, and where the beneficiaries of the proceeds
of the two causes of action were not the same, a different conclusion
might be reached. It is suggested, however, that the result might
still be the same, for in Matter of Fortu-noif,3z5 the court directed a
hearing for the proper allocation of the settlement sum as between the
two causes of action. The Helman case, then, may stand for the
proposition that although the trial judge committed error in not obey-
ing the mandate of the statute, since it was not prejudicial and counsel
did not properly take exception, the verdict will stand.
The 1935 additions to the law would seem to indicate that the
legislature had intended to define the damages in a personal injury
action so that they would not in any way duplicate those in a death
action. The supposed purpose would be to change the rule that a
recovery by the injured person prevents the accrual of a cause of
action for damages to the beneficiaries for the death of such injured
person. This would follow logically from the fact that the beneficia-
ries have an interest in the life of the injured person.3 6 Such interest
should not be destroyed by the act of the injured person in recovering
damages, which compensate only for his injuries and not for the inva-
34 Respondent's Brief, p. 11, Helman v. Markoff, 280 N. Y. 641, 20 N. E.(2d) 1012 (1939).
35 167 Misc. 119, 3 N. Y. Supp. 549 (1888).
36 Here we find a situation analogous to that arising under Section 18 of
the Decedent Estate Law, where a married person is given an interest in prop-
erty df his spouse while alive, to the extent provided in the statute. It is an
expectant interest dependent on the contingency that property to which it
attaches becomes part of the decedent's estate (Newman v. Dore, 250 App. Div.
708, 294 N. Y. Supp. 499 (1st Dept. 1937), aff'd, 275 N. Y. 271, 9 N. E. (2d)
966 (1937)) ; and, it will be protected to the extent that married persons may
not strip themselves of their property for the sole purpose of destroying the
right of inheritance protected by this statute (Bodner v. Feit, 247 App. Div.
119, 236 N. Y. Supp. 314 (1st Dept. 1936)). However, just as an injured
person can, in his lifetime, destroy the cause of action accruing upon his death
for damages to his next of kin, so can a married person destroy the interest of
his spouse in his property by an effet-tive transfer of his property while alive
(Newman v. Dore, supra).
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sion of the interest of the beneficiaries. However, in Fontheim v.
Third Avenue Railway,3 7 it was held that "The foundation of every
[death] action of this kind is in the injury which caused the death,
and not merely in the fact of death itself, and if an injured person
recovers a judgment for that injury during his lifetime or compromises
his claims and accepts satisfaction for his injury, his representatives
cannot maintain any action upon his subsequent death resulting there-
from." On closer study of the statute, this decision appears sound.
The enactment does not relate specifically to personal injury actions,
but is designed to prevent the abatement of such actions, and applies
only to those continued or brought after the death of the injured per-
son. A recovery by one who was permanently disabled for life as a
result of a wrongful act, would include damages for the loss of earnings
for the probable duration of his working days. These damages would
supposedly compensate him for the injury, and enable him to continue
to support his family and pay his debts. "In this situation, it is
obvious that a recovery under the wrongful death statute, assuming
the injury causes premature death, would result in a duplication of
damages. Here, one right of action affords complete relief." 88
BERNARD SCHIFF.
LIABILITY OF DEPARTMiENT STORES FOR TORTS OF LESSEES
Theory of Action
It is a fundamental rule in the law of agency, that a principal is
liable for the acts of his agent 1 done within the scope of his employ-
37 257 App. Div. 147, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 90 (1st Dept. 1939), app. granted,
257 App. Div. 948, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 281 (1st Dept. 1939), app. denied, 281 N. Y.
392, 24 N. E. (2d) 95 (1940).
38 N. Y. LAw REvisION CommissIoN, Leg. Doc. (1935) No. 60 (E) p. 55.
'Hoffman v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 92 U. S. 161 (1875);
Vicksburg & M. R. R. v. O'Brien, 119 U. S. 99, 7 Sup. Ct. 118 (1886) ; Ameri-
can Bonding and Trust Co. v. Takahashi, 111 Fed. 125 (C. C. A. 9th, 1901) ;
Mather v. Barnes, 146 Fed. 1000 (C. C. A. 2d, 1906); Armour v. Michigan
C. R. R., 65 N. Y. 111 (1875); Isham v. Post, 141 N. Y. 100, 35 N. E. 1084
(1894) ; MECHEM, AGENCY § 704; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 140.
The common law maxims respondeat superior and qui facit per alium,
facit per se form the basis for the principal's liability. The thought is that
every man owes a duty to use care in conducting his affairs. Violation of this
duty by his agent to the subsequent injury of a third party, should make the
principal liable, since he has the privilege of selecting his alter ego.
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